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Abstract
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are commonly used for
various traffic analysis problems, such as website fingerprint-
ing and flow correlation, as they outperform traditional (e.g.,
statistical) techniques by large margins. However, deep neural
networks are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples:
adversarial inputs to the model that get labeled incorrectly
by the model due to small adversarial perturbations. In this
paper, for the first time, we show that an adversary can defeat
DNN-based traffic analysis techniques by applying adversar-
ial perturbations on the patterns of live network traffic.
Applying adversarial perturbations (examples) on traffic
analysis classifiers faces two major challenges. First, the per-
turbing party (i.e., the adversary) should be able to apply the
adversarial network perturbations on live traffic, with no need
to buffering traffic or having some prior knowledge about
upcoming network packets. We design a systematic approach
to creating adversarial perturbations that are independent of
their target network traffic, and therefore can be applied in
real-time on live traffic. We therefore call such adversarial
perturbations blind.
Second, unlike image classification applications, perturbing
traffic features is not straight-forward as this needs to be done
while preserving the correctness of dependent traffic features.
We address this challenge by introducing remapping functions
that we use to enforce different network constraints while
creating blind adversarial perturbations.
Our blind adversarial perturbations algorithm is generic
and can be applied on various types of traffic classifiers. We
demonstrate this for state-of-the-art website fingerprinting
and flow correlation techniques, the two most-studied types
of traffic analysis. We also show that our blind adversarial
perturbations are even transferable between different models
and architectures, so they can be applied by blackbox adver-
saries. Finally, we show that existing countermeasures per-
form poorly against blind adversarial perturbations, therefore,
we introduce a tailored countermeasure.
1 Introduction
Traffic analysis is the art of inferring sensitive information
from the patterns of network traffic (as opposed to packet
contents), in particular, packet timings and sizes. Traffic anal-
ysis is useful in scenarios where network traffic is encrypted,
since encryption does not significantly modify traffic patterns.
In particular, previous work has studied traffic analysis al-
gorithms that either compromise the privacy of encrypted
traffic (e.g., by linking anonymous communications [35, 47])
or enhance its security by fingerprinting malicious, obfuscated
connections (e.g., stepping stone attacks [23, 57]).
Recent advances in traffic analysis leverage deep neural net-
works (DNNs) to design classifiers that are significantly (in
some cases, orders of magnitude) more efficient and more re-
liable than traditional traffic analysis techniques. In particular,
the recent website fingerprinting work of Deep Fingerprint-
ing [47] outperforms all prior fingerprinting techniques in
classifying webpages, and the DeepCorr [35] flow correlation
technique is able to link anonymized traffic flows with accu-
racies two orders magnitude superior to prior flow correlation
techniques. Given the increasing use of DNNs in traffic analy-
sis applications, we ask ourselves the following question: can
DNN-based traffic analysis techniques get defeated through
adversarially perturbing —live—traffic patterns?
Note that adversarial perturbations is an active area of re-
search in various image processing applications [9, 13, 18, 22,
29,33,34,50] (referred to as adversarial examples). However,
applying adversarial perturbations on network traffic is not
trivial, as it faces two major challenges. First, the perturbing
entity, i.e., the adversary,1 should be able to apply his adver-
sarial perturbations on live network traffic, without buffering
the target traffic or knowing the patterns of upcoming network
packets. This is because in most traffic analysis applications,
as will be introduced, the adversary can not influence the gen-
eration of target traffic, but he can only intercept the packets of
the target traffic and perturb them on the fly. In this paper, we
1In our context, the adversary is not necessarily a malicious party; it is
the entity who aims to defeat the underlying DNN traffic classifiers.
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are the first to design techniques that adversarially perturb live
network traffic to defeat DNN-based traffic classifiers; we call
our approach blind adversarial perturbations. Our technique
applies adversarial perturbations on live packets as they ap-
pear on the wire. The key idea of our adversarial perturbations
algorithm is that it generates “blind” perturbations that are
independent of the target inputs by solving specific optimiza-
tion problems that will be explained. We design adversarial
perturbation mechanisms for the key features commonly used
in traffic analysis applications: our adversarial perturbations
include changing the timings and sizes of packets, as well as
inserting dummy network packets.
The second challenge to applying adversarial perturbations
on traffic analysis applications is that, any perturbation mecha-
nism on network traffic should preserve various constraints of
traffic patterns, e.g., the dependencies between different traffic
features, the statistical distribution of timings/sizes expected
from the underlying protocol, etc. This is unlike traditional
adversarial example studies (in the context of image process-
ing) that modify image pixel values individually. Therefore,
one can not simply borrow techniques from traditional adver-
sarial examples. We consequently design various remapping
functions and regularizers, that we incorporate into our op-
timization problem to enforce such network constraints. As
will be shown, in most scenarios the constraints are not dif-
ferentiable, and therefore we carefully craft custom gradient
functions to approximate their gradients.
Evaluations: Our blind adversarial perturbations algorithm
is generic and can be applied to various types of traffic clas-
sifiers. We demonstrate this by applying our techniques on
state-of-the-art website fingerprinting [3,47] and flow correla-
tion [35] techniques, the two most-studied types of traffic anal-
ysis. Our evaluations show that our adversarial perturbations
can effectively defeat DNN-based traffic analysis techniques
through small, live adversarial perturbations. For instance,
our perturbations can reduce the accuracy of state-of-the-art
website fingerprinting [3, 47] works by 90% by only adding
10% bandwidth overhead. Also, our adversarial perturbations
can reduce the true positive rate of state-of-the-art flow corre-
lation techniques [35] from 0.9 to 0.2 by applying tiny delays
with a 50ms jitter standard deviation.
We also show that our blind adversarial perturbations
are transferable between different models and architectures,
which signifies their practical importance as they can be im-
plemented by blackbox adversaries.
Countermeasures: We conclude by studying various coun-
termeasures against our adversarial perturbations. We start
by leveraging existing defenses against adversarial examples
from the image classification literature and adapting them
to the traffic analysis scenario. We show that such adapted
defenses are not effective against our network adversarial
perturbations as they do not take into account the specific
constraints of traffic features. Motivated by this, we design
a tailored countermeasure for our network adversarial per-
turbations, which we demonstrate to be more effective than
the adapted defenses. The key idea of our countermeasure
is performing adversarial training, and using our attack as a
regularizer to train robust traffic analysis models.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Problem Statement
Traffic analysis is to infer sensitive information from the
patterns of network traffic, i.e., packet timings and sizes.
Therefore, many works have investigated the use of traf-
fic analysis in various scenarios where traffic contents are
encrypted. In particular, traffic analysis has been used to
compromise anonymity in anonymous communications sys-
tems through various types of attacks, specifically, website
fingerprinting [3,5,19,38,39,44,47,53–55], and flow correla-
tion [11,23,24,31,35–37,46,49,60]. Traffic analysis has also
been used to trace back cybercriminals who obfuscate their
identifies through stepping stone relays [23, 24, 35, 57, 59].
Our problem: Defeating DNN-based traffic analysis algo-
rithms The state-of-the-art traffic analysis techniques use
deep neural networks (DNN) to offer much higher perfor-
mances than prior techniques. For instance, DeepCorr [35]
provides a flow correlation accuracy of 96% compared to 4%
of statistical-based systems like RAPTOR [49] (in a given set-
ting). Also, Var-CNN [3] leverages deep learning techniques
to perform a website fingerprinting attack which achieves
98% accuracy in a closed-world setting. However, deep learn-
ing models are infamous for being susceptible to various
adversarial attacks where the adversary adds small perturba-
tions to the inputs to mislead the deep learning model. Such
techniques are known as adversarial examples in the context
of image processing, but have not been investigated in the
traffic analysis domain. In this work, we study the possibility
of defeating DNN-based traffic analysis techniques through
adversarial perturbations.
In our setting, some traffic analysis parties use DNN-
based traffic analysis techniques for various purposes, such as
breaking Tor’s anonymity or detecting cybercriminals. On the
other hand, the traffic analysis adversary(ies) aim at inter-
fering with the traffic analysis process through adversarially
perturbing traffic patterns of the connections they intercept.
To do so, the traffic analysis adversary(ies) perturb the traffic
patterns of the intercepted flows to reduce the accuracy of the
DNN-based classifiers used by the traffic analysis parties. To
further clarify the distinction between the players, in the flow
correlation setting, the traffic analysis “party” can be a mali-
cious ISP who aims at deanonymizing Tor users by analyzing
their Tor connections; however, the traffic analysis “adversary”
can be some (benign) Tor relays who perturb traffic patterns
of their connections to defeat potential traffic analysis attacks.
Challenges: Note that our problem resembles the setting
of adversarial examples for image classification. However,
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Current Time Future (unknown) packets
A blind adversary does not
need to know these in advance
A non-blind adversary needs to know all these patterns
A packet
Figure 1: Unlike traditional adversarial perturbation tech-
niques, our blind perturbation approach does not need to know
the patterns of its target connection.
applying adversarial perturbations on network traffic presents
two major challenges. First, the adversaries should be able to
apply adversarial perturbations on live network connections
where the patterns of upcoming network packets are unknown
to the adversaries. This is because in traffic analysis appli-
cations, the adversary is not in charge of generating traffic
patterns. For instance, in the flow correlation scenario, the traf-
fic analysis adversary is a benign Tor relay who intercepts and
(slightly) perturbs the traffic generated by Tor users. The sec-
ond challenge to applying network adversarial perturbations
is that they should preserve the various constraints of network
traffic, e.g., the dependencies of different traffic features.
Sketch of our approach: In this work, we design blind ad-
versarial perturbations, a set of techniques to perform adver-
sarial network perturbations that overcome the two mentioned
challenges. To address the first challenge (applying on live
traffic), we design blind perturbation vectors that are indepen-
dent of their target traffic, therefore, they can be applied on
any (unknown) network flows. Figure 1 shows what is needed
by our blind perturbations adversary compared to traditional
(non-blind) perturbation techniques. We generate such blind
adversarial perturbations by solving a specific optimization
problem. We address the second challenge (enforcing net-
work constraints) by using various remapping functions and
regularizers that adjust perturbed traffic features to follow the
required constraints.
2.2 Threat Model
Adversary’s knowledge of the inputs. We assume the ad-
versary has no prior knowledge about the patterns of upcom-
ing network packets of the target connections to be perturbed.
Therefore, the goal of the adversary is to craft input-agnostic
perturbation vectors that once applied to arbitrary network
flows, such flows are misclassified by the target DNN-based
traffic analysis algorithms.
Adversary’s Knowledge of the model. We start with an
adversary who has a white-box access to the target model to be
defeated, i.e., he knows the target DNN model’s architecture
and parameters (Section 4). Then, in Section 9 we extend
our attack to a blackbox setting where the adversary has no
knowledge of the target model’s architecture or parameters,
by leveraging the transferability of our technique.
Adversary’s Knowledge of the training data. We assume
the adversary knows a set of samples from the same distribu-
tion as the training dataset of the target model. For example,
in the website fingerprinting application the adversary can
browse the target websites to be misclassified to obtain such
training samples.
Attack’s target. We consider four types of attacks, i.e., ST-
DT, ST-DU, SU-DT, and SU-DU, based on the adversary’s source
and destination targets as defined below:
a) Destination-targeted/untargeted (DT/DU): We call the
attack destination-targeted (DT) if the goal of the adversary is
to make the model misclassify arbitrary inputs into a specific,
target output class. On the other hand, we call the attack
destination-untargeted (DU) if the goal is to misclassify inputs
into arbitrary (incorrect) output classes.
b) Source-targeted/untargeted (ST/SU): A source-targeted
(ST) adversary is one whose goal is to have inputs from a
specific input class misclassified by the traffic analysis model.
By contrast, a source-untargeted (SU) adversary is one who
aims at causing arbitrary inputs classes to get misclassified.
3 Background
3.1 Deep learning
A deep neural network (DNN) consists of a series of linear
and nonlinear functions, known as layers. Each layer has a
weight matrix wi and an activation function. For a given input
x, we denote the output of a DNN model by:
f (x) = f wnn ( f
wn−1
n−1 (· · · f w11 (x1x))) · · ·)
where f wii is the i−th layer of the deep neural network (note
that we use bold letters to represent vectors as in x). We focus
on supervised learning, where we have a set of labeled training
data. Let X be a set of data points in the target d-dimensional
space, where each dimension represents one attribute of the
input data points. We assume there is an oracle O which maps
the data points to their labels. For the sake of simplicity, we
only focus on classification tasks.
The goal of training is to find a classification model f that
maps each point in X to its correct class in the set of classes, Y .
To obtain f , one needs to define a lower-bounded, real-valued
loss function l( f (x),O(x)) that for each data point x measures
the difference between O(x) and the model’s prediction f (x).
Therefore, the loss function for f can be defined as:
L( f ) = E
(x,y)∼Pr(X ,Y )
[l( f (x),y)] (1)
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and the objective of training is to find an f that minimizes
this loss function. Since Pr(X ,Y ) is not entirely available
to the training entities, in practice, a set of samples from it,
called the training set Dtrain ⊂ X ×Y , is used to train the
model [52]. Therefore, instead of minimizing (1), machine
learning algorithms minimize the expected empirical loss of
the model over its training set D:
LDtrain( f ) =
1
|Dtrain| ∑
(x,y)∈Dtrain
l( f (x),y) (2)
Therefore, a deep neural network f is trained by tuning its
weight parameters to minimize its empirical loss function
over a (large) set of known input-output pairs (x,y). This is
commonly performed using a variation of the gradient descent
algorithm, e.g., back propagation [15].
3.2 Adversarial Examples
An adversarial example is an adversarially crafted input that
fools a target classifier or regression model into making in-
correct classifications or predictions. The adversary’s goal is
to generate adversarial examples by adding minimal pertur-
bations to the input data attributes. Therefore, an adversarial
example x∗ can be crafted by solving the following optimiza-
tion problem:
x∗ = x+ argmin{z : O(x+ z) 6= O(x)}= x+δx (3)
where x is a non-adversarial input sample,
δx is the adversarial perturbation added to it, and O(·) rep-
resents the true label of its input, as defined in the previous
section. The adversary’s objective is to adds a minimal per-
turbation δx to force the target model misclassify the input x.
Adversarial examples are commonly studied in image classi-
fication applications, where a constraint in finding adversarial
examples is that the added noise should be imperceptible to
the human eyes.
In this paper, we will investigate the application of ad-
versarial examples on network connections with different
imperceptibility constraints.
Previous works [13, 17, 18, 30, 33] have suggested several
ways to generate adversarial examples. The Fast Gradient
Sign Method (FGSM) [18] algorithm generates an adversarial
sample by calculating the following perturbation for a given
model f and a loss function l:
δx = ε×Sign(∇x l( f (x),y)) (4)
where ∇x l( f (x),y) is the model’s loss gradient w.r.t. the input
x, and the y is the input’s label. Therefore, the adversarial per-
turbation is the sign of the model’s loss gradient w.r.t. the input
x and label y. Also, ε is a coefficient controlling the amplitude
of the perturbation. Therefore, the adversarial perturbation in
FGSM is the sign of model’s gradient. The adversary adds
the perturbation to x to craft an adversarial example. Kurakin
et al. [30] proposed a targeted version of FGSM, where the
adversary’s goal is to fool the model to classify inputs as a de-
sired target class (as opposed to any class in FGSM). Kurakin
et al. also introduced an iterative method to improve the suc-
cess rate of the generated examples. Dong et al. [13] showed
that using the momentum approach can improve Kurkain et
al.’s iterative method. Also, Carlini and Wagner [8] designed
a set of attacks that can craft adversarial examples when the
adversary has various norm constraints (e.g., l0, l1, l∞). Other
variations of adversarial examples [14, 48] have been intro-
duced to craft adversarial examples that consider different
sets of constraints or improve the adversary’s success rate.
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [33] introduced universal adversar-
ial perturbations where the adversary generates adversarial
examples that are independent of the inputs.
3.3 Traffic Analysis Techniques
We overview the two major classes of traffic analysis tech-
niques, which we will use to demonstrate our network adver-
sarial perturbations.
Flow correlation: Flow correlation aims at linking obfus-
cated network flows by correlating their traffic characteristics,
i.e., packet timings and sizes [2, 23, 35, 36]. In particular, the
Tor anonymity system has been the target of flow correlation
attacks, where an adversary aims at linking ingress and egress
segments of a Tor connection by correlating traffic charac-
teristics. Traditional flow correlation techniques mainly use
standard statistical correlation metrics to correlate the vectors
of flow timings and sizes across flows, in particular mutual
information [11, 60], Pearson correlation [31, 46], cosine sim-
ilarity [24, 37], and Spearman correlation [49]. More recently,
Nasr et al. [35] design a DNN-based approach for flow correla-
tion, called DeepCorr. They show that DeepCorr outperforms
statistical flow correlation techniques by large margins.
Website Fingerprinting: Website fingerprinting (WF) aims
at detecting the websites visited over encrypted channels like
VPNs, Tor, and other proxies [3, 5, 19, 38, 39, 44, 47, 53–55].
The attack is performed by a passive adversary who moni-
tors the victim’s encrypted network traffic, e.g., a malicious
ISP or a surveillance agency. The adversary compares the
victim’s observed traffic flow against a set of prerecorded
webpage traces, to identify the webpage being browsed. Web-
site fingerprinting differs from flow correlation in that the
adversary only observes one end of the connection, e.g., the
connection between a client and a Tor relay. Website finger-
printing has been widely studied in the context of Tor traffic
analysis [3, 5, 19, 38, 39, 44, 47, 54].
Various machine learning classifiers have been used for
WF, e.g., using KNN [53], SVM [38], and random forest [19].
However, the state-of-the-art WF algorithms use Convolu-
tional Neural Networks to perform website fingerprinting, i.e.,
Sirinam et al. [47], Rimmer et al. [44], and Bhat et al. [3].
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Defenses: Note that our blind adversarial perturbations tech-
nique serves as a defense mechanism against traffic analysis
classifiers (as it aims at fooling the underlying classifiers).
The literature has proposed other defenses against website
fingerprinting and flow correlation attacks [4,10,26,56]. Sim-
ilar to our work, such defenses work by manipulating traffic
features, i.e., packet timings, sizes, and directions.
In Section 7.5, we compare the performance of our blind
adversarial perturbations with state-of-the-art defenses, show-
ing that our technique outperforms all of these techniques in
defeating traffic analysis.
Also, note that some recent works have considered using
adversarial perturbations as a defense against traffic analysis.
In particular, Mockingbird [25] generates adversarial pertur-
bations to defeat website fingerprinting, and Zhang et al. [58]
apply adversarial examples to defeat video classification using
traffic analysis. However, both of these works are non-blind,
i.e., the adversary needs to know the patterns of the target
flows in advance; therefore, we consider them to be unusable
in typical traffic analysis scenarios. By contrast, our blind
perturbation technique modifies live network connections.
4 Formalulating Blind Adversarial Perturba-
tions
In this section, we present the key formulation and algorithms
for generating blind adversarial perturbations.
4.1 The General Formulation
We formulate the blind adversarial perturbations problem as
the following optimization problem:
argmin
δ
∀x ∈ DS : f (x+δ) 6= f (x) (5)
where the objective is to find a (blind) perturbation vector, δ,
such that when added to an arbitrary input from a target input
domain DS, it will cause the underlying DNN model f (.) to
misclassify. In a source-targeted (ST) attack (see definitions
in Section 2.2), DS contains inputs from a target class to be
misclassifies, whereas in a source-untargeted (SU) attack DS
will be a large set of inputs from different classes.
Note that one cannot find a closed-form solution for this
optimization problem since the target model f (.) is a non-
convex ML model, i.e., a deep neural network. Therefore, (5)
can be formulated as follows to numerically solve the problem
using empirical approximation techniques:
argmax
δ
∑
x∈DS
l( f (x+δ), f (x)) (6)
where l is the target model’s loss function and DS ⊂DS is the
adversary’s network training dataset.
Note that prior work by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [33] has
studied the generation of universal adversarial perturbations
for image recognition applications. We, however, take a dif-
ferent direction in generating blind perturbations: in contrast
to finding a perturbation vector δ that maximizes the loss
function in [33], we aim to find a perturbation generator
model G. This generator model G will generate adversarial
perturbation vectors when provided with a random trigger
parameter z (we denote the corresponding adversarial pertur-
bation as δz = G(z)), i.e., we are able to generate different
perturbations on different random z’s. Therefore, the goal of
our optimization problem is to optimize the parameters of the
perturbation generator model G (as opposed to optimizing a
perturbation vector δ in [33]). Using a generator model in-
creases the attack performance, as shown previously [1, 20]
and validated through our experiments. Hence, we formulate
our optimization problem as:
argmax
G
E
z∼uni f orm(0,1)
[ ∑
x∈DS
l( f (x+G(z)), f (x))] (7)
We can use existing optimization techniques (e.g.,
Adam [27]) to solve this problem. In each iteration of training,
our algorithm selects a batch from the training dataset and a
random trigger z, then computes the objective function.
4.2 Incorporating Traffic Constraints
Studies of adversarial examples for image recognition appli-
cations [13, 17, 18, 30, 33] simply modify image pixel values
individually. However, applying adversarial perturbations on
network traffic is much more challenging due to the various
constraints of network traffic that should be preserved while
applying the perturbations. In particular, inter-packet delays
should have non-negative values; the target network protocol
may need to follow specific packet size/timing distributions;
packets should not be removed from a connection; and, packet
numbers should get adjusted after injecting new packets.
One can add other network constraints depending on the
underlying network protocol. We use remapping and regular-
ization functions to enforce these domain constraints while
creating blind adversarial perturbations. A remapping func-
tion adjusts the perturbed traffic patterns so they comply with
some domain constraints. For example, when an adversary
adds a packet to a traffic flow at position i, the remapping
function should shift the indices of all consecutive packets.
We therefore reformulate our optimization problem by in-
cluding the remapping function M :
argmax
G
E
z∼uni f orm(0,1)
[ ∑
x∈DS
l( f (M (x,G(z))), f (x))] (8)
Moreover, we add a regularization term to the loss function
so that the adversary can enforce additional constraints, as
will be discussed. Therefore, the following is our complete
optimization problem:
argmax
G
E
z∼uni f orm(0,1)
[( ∑
x∈DS
l( f (M (x,G(z))), f (x)))+R (G(z))]
(9)
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Algorithm 1 Generating Blind Adversarial Perturbations
DS← adversary training data
f ← target model
L f ← target model loss function
M ← domain remapping function
R ← domain regularizations function
G(z)← initialize the blind adversarial perturbation model parameters (θG)
T ← epochs
DT← the destination target class or false o.w.
ST← the source target classes or false o.w.
for epoch t ∈ {1 · · ·T} do
for all mini-batch bi in DS do
if ST then
bi← select instances only with the ST class label
end if
z∼ Uniform
if DT then
J =−( 1|bi | ∑x∈bi l( f (M (x,G(z))), f (x)))+R (G(z))
else
J = ( 1|bi| ∑x∈bi , l( f (M (x,G(z))),DT))+R (G(z))
end if
Update G to minimize J
end for
end for
return G
We adjust (9) for a destination-targeted (DT)
attack by replacing l( f (M (x,G(z))), f (x)) with
−l( f (M (x,G(z))),OT ), where OT is the target output
class. Also, remind that for source-targeted attacks, DS
contains samples only from the target classes.
4.3 Overview of the Algorithm
Algorithm 1 summarizes our approach to generate blind ad-
versarial perturbations (Figure 8 in Appendix C illustrates the
main components of our algorithm). In each iteration, Algo-
rithm 1 computes the gradient of the objective function w.r.t.
the blind perturbation for given inputs, and optimizes it by
moving in the direction of the gradient. The algorithm en-
forces domain constraints using various remapping and regu-
larization functions. We use the iterative mini-batch stochastic
gradient ascent [15] technique.
5 Perturbation Techniques
The traffic analysis literature uses three main features for
building traffic analysis classifiers: 1) packet timings [3, 35],
2) packet sizes [35], and 3) packet directions [3, 44, 47, 53].
Our blind adversarial perturbation technique leverages these
features to adversarially perturb traffic. These features can
be modified either by delaying packets, resizing packets, or
injecting new (dummy) packets (dropping packets is not an
option as it will break the underlying applications). We de-
scribe how we perform such perturbations.
5.1 Manipulating Existing Packets
The adversary can modify the timings and sizes (but not the
directions) of existing packets of a target network connec-
tion. We present a network connection as a vector of features:
F = [ f1, f2, · · · , fn], where fi can represent the size, timing,
direction, or a combination of these features for the ith packet.
The adversary designs a blind adversarial perturbation model
G, as introduced in Section 4, such that it outputs a pertur-
bation vector G(z) = [g1,g2, · · · ,gn] with the same size as F .
The adversary adds G(z) to the original traffic patterns as pack-
ets arrive, so F p =F +G(z)= [ f1+g1, f2+g2, · · · , f1+gn] is
the patterns of the perturbed connection. The main challenge
is that the perturbed traffic features, F p, should not violate
the domain constraints of the target network application.
Perturbing timings: We first introduce how the timing
features can be perturbed. We use inter-packet delays (IPDs)
to represent the timing information of packets. An important
constraint on the timing features is that the adversary should
not introduce excessive delays on the packets as excessive de-
lays will either interfere with the underlying application (e.g.,
Tor relays are not willing to introduce large latencies) or give
away the adversary. We control the amount of delay added by
the adversary by using a remapping function M T as follows:
M T (x,G(z),µ,σ) = x+
G(z)−max(G(z)−µ,0)−min(G(z)+µ,0)
std(G(z))
min(std(G(z)),σ)
(10)
where G(z) is the mean of perturbation G(z), and µ and σ are
the maximum allowed average and standard deviation of the
delays, respectively. Using this remapping function, we can
govern the amount of latency added to the packets.
A second constraint on timing features is that the perturbed
timings should follow the statistical distributions expected
from the target protocol. Towards this, we leverage a regu-
larizer R to enforce the desired statistical behavior on the
blind perturbations. Our regularizer enforces a Laplacian dis-
tribution for network jitters, as suggested by prior work [36],
but it can enforce arbitrary distributions. To do this, we use
a generative adversarial network (GAN) [16]: we design a
discriminator model D(G(x)) which tries to distinguish the
generated perturbations from a Laplace distribution. Then, we
use this discriminator as our regularizer function to make the
distribution of the crafted perturbations similar to a Laplace
distribution. We simultaneously train the blind perturbation
model and the discriminator model. This is summarized in
Algorithm 2.
Perturbing sizes: An adversary can perturb packet sizes by
increasing packets sizes (through appending dummy bits).
However, modified packet sizes should not violate the ex-
pected maximum packet size of the underlying protocol as
well as the expected statistical distribution of the sizes. For
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Algorithm 2 GAN-based timing regularizer
DS← adversary training data
f ← target model
G← blind adversarial perturbation model
D← discrimination model
µ,b← target desired Laplace distribution parameters
for t ∈ {1,2, · · · ,T} do
z′ ∼ Lapace(µ,b)
z∼ Uniform()
train D on G(z) with label 1 and z′ with label 0
train G on DS using regularizer D
end for
return z
Algorithm 3 Size remapping function
a← G(z)
x← input
N← maximum sum of added sizes
n← maximum added size to each packet
s← cell sizes
for i in argsort(-a) do
if N ≤ 0 then
break
end if
δ= bmin(s a[i]s ,n,N)c
N = N−δ
x[i] = x[i]+δ
end for
return x
instance, Tor packets are expected to have certain packet sizes.
We use the remapping function M S, as shown in Algo-
rithm 3, to adjust the amplitude of size modifications as well
as to enforce the desired statistical distributions. The input
to Algorithm 3 is the blind adversarial perturbation (G(z)),
the desired maximum bytes of added traffic (N), the desired
maximum added bytes to a single packet (n), and the expected
packet size distribution of the underlying network protocol
(s) (if the network protocol does not have any specific size
constraints, then s = 1). Algorithm 3 starts by selecting the
highest values from the output of the adversarial perturba-
tions and adds them to the traffic flows up to N bytes. Since
Algorithm 3 is not differentiable, we cannot simply use Al-
gorithm 1. Instead, we define a custom gradient function for
Algorithm 3 which allows us to train the blind adversarial
perturbation model. Given the gradient of the target model’s
loss w.r.t. the output of Algorithm 3 (i.e., ∇xM S(x,G(z))),
we modify the perturbation model’s gradient as:
∇G(z) = ∑
x∈bi
∇xM S(x,G(z)) (11)
where bi is the selected training batch. We do not need regu-
larization for packet sizes.
5.2 Injecting Adversarial Packets
In addition to perturbing the features of existing packets, the
adversary can also inject packets with specific sizes and at
Algorithm 4 Packet insertion remapping function
l← G(z)
x← input
n← number of added packets
p = position of top n absolute values of l
for i in p do
insert +1 if l[i] > 0, otherwise −1 to x at position i and shift other
features
end for
return x
specific times into the target connection to be perturbed. The
goal of our adversary is to identify the most adversarial timing
and sizes for injected packets. We design a remapping func-
tion M I (Algorithm 4) that obtains the ordering of injected
packets as well as their feature values. Similar to the previous
attack, Algorithm 4 is not differentiable and we cannot sim-
ply use it for Algorithm 1. Instead, we use a custom gradient
function for Algorithm 4 which allows us to train our blind ad-
versarial perturbation model. We define the gradient function
for different types of feature as described in the following.
Injecting adversarial directions: While an adversary can-
not change the directions of existing packets, she can inject ad-
versarial directions by adding packets. A connection’s packet
directions can be represented as a series of -1 (downstream)
and +1 (upstream) values. However, generating adversarial
perturbations with binary values is not straightforward.
We generate a perturbation vector G(z) with the same size
as the target connection. Each element of this vector shows
the effect of inserting a packet at that specific position (i.e.,
l in Algorithm 4). We select positions with largest absolute
values for packet injection; the sign of the selected position
determines the direction of the injected packet. Finally, we
modify the perturbation model’s gradient as:
∇G(z) = ∑
x∈bi
∇xM I(x,G(z)) (12)
Injecting adversarial timings/sizes: Unlike packet direc-
tions, for the timing and size features, we need to learn both
the positions and the values of the added packets simultane-
ously. We design the perturbation generation model to output
two vectors for the locations and the values of the added pack-
ets, where the value vector represents the selected feature
(timing or sizes). We use the gradient function defined in (12)
for the position of the inserted packets. We use Algorithm 5 to
compute the gradients for the values of the inserted packets.
Injecting multiple adversarial features: To inject packets
that simultaneously perturb several features, we modify the
perturbation generation model G to output one vector for the
position of the injected packets and one for each feature set
to be perturbed. We use Algorithm 5 to compute the gradient
of each vector. Moreover, we cannot use (12) to compute the
gradient for the position vector, therefore, we take the average
between the gradient of all different input feature vectors.
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Algorithm 5 Value Vector Gradient
l,a← G(z)
∇M (x,G(z))← gradient w.r.t. M (x,G(z))
∇G(z)← #»0
n← number of added packets
p = position of top n values of l
for i in p do
∇G(z)[i] = ∇M (x,G(z))[i]
end for
return ∇G(z)
6 Experimental Setup
Here we discuss the setting of our experiments, which we
implemented in PyTorch [42].
6.1 Metrics
For a given blind adversarial perturbation generator G(·) and
test dataset Dtest , we define the attack success metric as:
A =
{
1
|Dtest | ∑(x,y)∈Dtest 1[ f (x+G(z)) 6= y] DU
1
|Dtest | ∑(x,y)∈Dtest 1[ f (x+G(z)) = t] DT
(13)
where DU and DT represent destination-untargeted and targeted
attack scenarios, respectively (as defined in Section 2.2). For
source-targeted (ST) cases, Dtest contains instances only from
the target source class. Also, in our evaluations of the tar-
geted attacks (ST and DT), we only report the results for target
classes with minimum and maximum attack accuracies. For
example, “Max ST-DT” indicates the best results for the source
and destination targeted attacks, and we present the target
classes using the TargetDest ← TargetSrc notation, which
means class TargetDest is the targeted destination class and
TargetSrc is the targeted source class. The maximum accu-
racy shows the worst case scenario for the target model and
the minimum accuracy shows the lower bound on the adver-
sary’s success rate. If there are multiple classes that lead to a
max/min accuracy, we only mention one of them.
Note that while we can use A to evaluate attack success in
various settings, for the flow correlation experiments we use a
more specific metric (as there are only two output classes for a
flow correlation classifier). Specifically, we use the reduction
in true positive and false positive rates of the target flow
correlation algorithm to evaluate the success of our attack.
6.2 Target Systems
We demonstrate our attack on three state-of-the-art DNN-
based traffic analysis systems.
DeepCorr: DeepCorr [35] is the state-of-the-art flow correla-
tion system, which uses deep learning to learn flow correlation
functions for specific network settings like that of Tor. Deep-
Corr uses inter-packet delays (IPDs) and sizes of the packets
as the features. DeepCorr uses Convolutional neural networks
to extract complex features from the raw timing and size in-
formation, and it outperforms the conventional statistical flow
correlation techniques by significant margins. Since Deep-
Corr uses both timings and sizes of packets as the features,
we apply the time-based and size-based attacks on DeepCorr.
As mentioned earlier, non-blind adversarial perturba-
tions [25, 58] are useless in the flow correlation setting, as
the adversary does not know the features of the upcoming
packets in a target connection. Hence, our blind perturbations
are applicable in this setting.
Var-CNN: Var-CNN [3] is a deep learning-based website fin-
gerprinting (WF) system that uses both manual and automated
feature extraction techniques to be able to work with even
small amounts of training data. Var-CNN uses ResNets [21]
with dilated casual convolutions, the state-of-the-art convo-
lutional neural network, as its base structure. Furthermore,
Var-CNN shows that in contrast to previous WF attacks, com-
bining packet timing information (IPDs) and direction infor-
mation can improve the performance of the WF adversary.
In addition to packet IPDs and directions, Var-CNN uses cu-
mulative statistical information for features of network flows.
Therefore, Var-CNN combines three different models, two
ResNet models for timing and direction information, and one
fully connected model for metadata statistical information as
the final structure. Var-CNN considers both closed-world and
open-world scenarios.
Similar to the setting of flow correlation, a WF adversary
will not be able to use traditional (non-blind) adversarial per-
turbations [25, 58], as she will not have knowledge on the
patterns of upcoming packets in a targeted connection. There-
fore, WF is a trivial application for blind perturbations. Since
Var-CNN uses both IPD and packet direction features for fin-
gerprinting, we use both timing-based and direction-based
techniques to generate our adversarial perturbations.
Deep Fingerprinting (DF): Deep Fingerprinting (DF) [47]
is a deep learning based WF attack which uses CNNs to
perform WF attacks on Tor. DF deploys automated feature
extraction, and uses the direction information for training.
In contrast to Var-CNN, DF does not require handcrafted
features of packet sequences. Similar to Var-CNN, DF con-
siders both closed-world and open-world scenarios. Sirinam
et al. [47] show that DF outperforms prior WF systems in
defeating WF defenses of WTF-PAD [26] and W-T [56].
Codes. As we perform our attack in PyTorch, we use the
original codes of DeepCorr, DF, and Var-CNN models and
convert them from TensorFlow to PyTorch. We then train
these models using the datasets of those papers.
6.3 Adversary Setup and Models
While our technique can be applied to any traffic analysis
setting, we present our setup for the popular Tor application.
Adversary’s Interception Points Our adversary has the
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same placement as traditional Tor traffic analysis works [44,
47, 54–56]. For the WF scenario, we assume the adversary
is manipulating the traffic between a Tor client and the first
Tor hop, i.e., a Tor bridge [12] or a Tor guard relay. There-
fore, our blind adversarial perturbation can be implemented
as a Tor pluggable transport [43], in which case the blind
perturbations are applied by both the Tor client software and
the Tor bridge. In the flow correlation setting, similar to the
literature, traffic manipulations are performed by Tor entry
and exit relays (since flow correlation attackers intercept both
egress and ingress Tor connections). In our evaluations, we
show that even applying our blind adversarial perturbations
on only ingress flows is enough to defeat flow correlation
attacks, i.e., the same adversary placement as the WF setting.
Adversarial Perturbation Models As mentioned in Sec-
tion 4, we design a deep learning model to generate blind
adversarial noises. For each type of perturbation, the adver-
sarial model is a fully connected model with one hidden layer
of size 500 and a ReLu activation function. The parameters
of the adversarial model are presented in Appendix B. The
input and output sizes of the adversarial model are equal to
the length of features in the target flow. In the forward func-
tion, the adversarial model takes in a given input, manipulates
it based on the attack method, and output a crafted version
of the input. In each iteration of training, we update the pa-
rameters of the adversarial model based on the loss functions
introduced in Section 4. We use Adam optimizer to learn the
blind noise with a learning rate of 0.001.
Discriminator Model As mentioned in Section 4, we use a
GAN model to enforce the time constraints of our modified
network flows. To do so, we design a fully-connected discrim-
inator model containing two hidden FC layers of size 1000.
The parameters of the discriminator model are presented in
Appendix B. The input and output sizes of this model are
equal to the sizes of the blind adversarial noise. In the train-
ing process, we use Adam optimizer with a learning rate of
0.0001 to learn the discriminator model.
6.4 Datasets
Tor Flow Correlation Dataset For flow correlation experi-
ments, we use the publicly available dataset of DeepCorr [35],
which contains 7000 flows for training and 500 flows for
testing. These flows are captured Tor flows of top Alexa’s
websites and contain timings and sizes of each of them. These
flows are then used to create a large set of flow pairs includ-
ing associated flow pairs (flows belonging to the same Tor
connection) and non-associated flow pairs (flows belonging
to arbitrary Tor connections). Each associated flow pair is
labeled with 1, and each non-associated flow pair with 0.
Tor Website Fingerprinting Datasets Var-CNN uses a
dataset of 900 monitored sites each with 2,500 traces. These
sites were compiled from the Alexa list of most popular web-
sites. Var-CNN is fed in with different sets of features repre-
senting a given trace; the direction-based ResNet model takes
a set of 1’s and -1’s as the direction of each packet such that
1 shows an outgoing packet and -1 represents an incoming
packet. The time-based ResNet uses the IPDs of the traces as
features. The metadata model takes in seven float numbers as
the statistical information of the traces. To be consistent with
previous WF attacks [44, 47, 54, 55], we use the first 5000
values of a given trace for both direction and time features.
DF uses a different dataset than Var-CNN. For the closed-
world setting, they collected the traces of 95 top Alexa web-
sites with 1000 visits for each. DF uses the same represen-
tation as Var-CNN for direction information of the packets.
Since CNNs only take in a fixed length input, DF considers
the first 5000 values of each flow.
7 Experiment Results
We evaluate blind adversarial perturbations against the target
systems of Section 6.2 using each of the three key traffic
features and their combinations. We also compare our attack
with traditional attacks.
7.1 Adversarially Perturbing Directions
As explained in Section 4, an adversary cannot change the
directions of existing packets, but he can insert packets with
adversarial directions. We evaluated our attack for different
adversary settings and strengths against Var-CNN [3] and
DF [47] (which use direction features). We used 10 epochs
and Adam optimizer to train the blind adversarial perturba-
tions model with a learning rate of 0.001. Tables 1 and 2
show the success of our attack (using A in (13)) on DF and
Var-CNN, respectively, when they only use packet directions
as their features. As can be seen, both DF and Var-CNN
are highly vulnerable to adversarial perturbation attacks
when the adversary only injects a small number of packets.
Specifically, we were able to generate targeted perturbations
that misclassify every input into a target class with only 25%
bandwidth overhead.
7.2 Adversarially Perturbing Timings
We consider two scenarios for generating adversarial timing
perturbations: with and without an invisibility constraint. In
both scenarios, we limited the adversaries’ power such that
the added noise to the timings of the packets has a maximum
mean and standard deviation as explained in Section 4. For
the invisibility constraint, we force the added noise to have
the same distribution as natural network jitter, which follows
a Laplace distribution [35]. The detailed parameters of our
model are presented in Appendix B.
Figure 2 shows the performance of our attack against Deep-
Corr when the adversary only manipulates the timings of
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Table 1: Direction perturbation attack on DeepFingerprinting [47] WF scheme (92% WF accuracy)
α Bandwith Overhead (%) A : SU-DU (%) Max ST-DU (#, %) Min ST-DU (#, %) Max SU-DT (#, %) Min SU-DT (#, %) Max ST-DT (#←#, %) Min ST-DT (#←#, %)
20 0.04 24.2 −,100.0 −,0.0 77,31.9 4,0.1 −,100.0 −,0.0
100 2.04 49.6 −,100.0 47,0.0 34,77.6 89,13.2 −,100.0 −,0.0
500 11.11 91.8 −,100.0 49,4.0 92,97.1 82,47.8 −,100.0 23← 69,0.1
1000 25.0 95.7 −,100.0 21,29.0 −,100.0 10,67.0 −,100.0 72← 47,4.4
2000 66.66 97.7 −,100.0 48,94.7 −,100.0 37,89.4 −,100.0 78← 60,35.4
Table 2: Direction perturbation attack on Var-CNN [3] WF scheme (93% WF accuracy)
α Bandwith Overhead (%) A : SU-DU (%) Max ST-DU (#, %) Min ST-DU (#, %) Max SU-DT (#, %) Min SU-DT (#, %) Max ST-DT (#←#, %) Min ST-DT (#←#, %)
20 0.04 76.1 −,100.0 −,0.0 2,68.3 8,53.2 −,100.0 −,0.0
100 2.04 80.3 −,100.0 −,100.0 4,76.5 2,66.8 −,100.0 −,0.0
500 11.11 96.8 −,100.0 −,100.0 3,98.9 9,81.7 −,100.0 −,10.0
1000 25.0 98.2 −,100.0 −,100.0 −,100.0 0,96.6 −,100.0 −,20.0
2000 66.66 99.0 −,100.0 −,100.0 −,100.0 8,97.6 −,100.0 −,30.0
packets. As expected, Figures 2a and 2b show that increasing
the strength (mean or standard deviation) of our blind noise
results in better performance of the attack, but even a per-
turbation with average 0 and a tiny standard deviation of
50ms significantly reduces the true positive of DeepCorr
from 96% to 40%.
Also, we can create effective adversarial perturbations
with high invisibility: Figure 3 shows the histogram of the
generated timing perturbations, with parameters µ = 0,σ=
30ms, learned under an invisibility constraint forcing it to fol-
low a Laplace distribution. For this invisible noise, Figure 2c
compares the performance of timing perturbations on Deep-
Corr with different attack strengths; it also shows the impact
of arbitrary Laplace distributed perturbations on DeepCorr.
We also apply our timing perturbations on Var-CNN. Ta-
ble 3 shows our attack success (A) with and without an invis-
ibility constraint. We realize that timing perturbations have
much larger impacts on Var-CNN than direction perturbations.
Moreover, as expected, in the untargeted scenario (SU-DU) and
for different bandwidth overheads, our attack has better perfor-
mance without the invisibility constraint. However, even with
an invisibility constraint, our attack reduces the accuracy
of Var-CNN drastically, i.e., a blind timing perturbation
with an average 0 and a tiny standard deviation of 20ms
reduces the accuracy of Var-CNN by 89.6%.
7.3 Adversarially Perturbing Sizes
We evaluate our size perturbation attack on DeepCorr, which
is the only system (among the three we studied) that uses
packet sizes for traffic analysis. As DeepCorr is mainly stud-
ied in the context of Tor, our perturbation algorithm enforces
the size distribution of Tor on the generated size perturbations.
Figure 4 shows the results when the adversary only manipu-
lates packet sizes. As can be seen, size perturbations are less
impactful on DeepCorr than timing perturbations, suggesting
that DeepCorr is more sensitive to the timings of packets.
7.4 Perturbing Multiple Features
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our adversarial
perturbations when we perturb multiple features simultane-
ously. Var-CNN uses both packet timing and directions to
fingerprint websites. Table 4 shows the impact of adversar-
ially perturbing both of these features on Var-CNN; we see
that combining perturbation attacks increases the impact
of the attack, e.g., in the untargeted scenario (SU-DU), the
combination of both attacks with parameters α = 100,µ =
0,σ= 10ms results in an attack success of A = 83.9% while
the time-based and direction-based perturbations alone re-
sult in A = 68.1% and A = 80.3%, respectively. Similarly,
in Figure 5, we see that by combining time and size pertur-
bations, the accuracy of DeepCorr drops from 88% to 49%
(with FP = 10−3) by injecting only 20 packets, while using
only time perturbations the accuracy drops to 68%.
7.5 Comparison With Traditional Attacks
There exist traditional attacks on DNN-based traffic analysis
systems that use techniques other than adversarial perturba-
tions. In this section, we compare our adversarial perturbation
attacks with such traditional approaches.
Packet insertion techniques: Several WF countermeasures
work by adding new packets. We show that our adversarial
perturbations are significantly more effective with simi-
lar overheads. WTF-PAD [26] is a state-of-the-art technique
which adaptively adds dummy packets to Tor traffic to evade
website fingerprinting systems. Using WTF-PAD on the DF
dataset reduces the WF accuracy to 3% at the cost of a 64%
bandwidth overhead. Similarly, the state-of-the-art Walkie-
Talkie [56] reduces DF’s accuracy to 5% with a 31% band-
width overhead and a 36% latency overhead [47]. On the other
hand, our injection-based targeted blind adversarial attack re-
duces the detection accuracy to 1% (close to random guess)
with only a 25% bandwidth overhead and no added latency
(using the exact same datasets). To compare existing WF coun-
10
10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 100
False Positive
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Tr
ue
 Po
sit
ive
σ = 10 ms
σ = 20 ms
σ = 50 ms
no noise
(a) µ = 0ms
10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 100
False Positive
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Tr
ue
 Po
sit
ive
μ = 0 ms
μ = 20 ms
μ = 50 ms
no noise
(b) σ= 20ms
10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 100
False Positive
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Tr
ue
 Po
sit
ive
σ = 10 ms
σ = 20 ms
Laplace σ = 10 ms
Laplace σ = 20 ms
no noise
(c) µ = 0ms with invisibility constraint
Figure 2: Timing perturbations on DeepCorr for different attack strengths, with/without an invisibility constraint.
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Figure 3: Blind timing perturbations
generated to follow a Laplace distribu-
tion with µ = 0,σ= 30ms.
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Figure 4: Size perturbations on DeepCorr
for different attack strengths
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Figure 5: Hybrid size/timing perturba-
tions on DeepCorr for different attack
strengths
termeasures with our results while using Var-CNN model, we
refer to their paper [3] where WTF-PAD can decrease the
accuracy of Var-CNN by 0.4% (from 89.2% to 88.8%) with
27% bandwidth overhead. However, according to Table 2,
with a similar bandwidth overhead (1000 inserted packets and
25% overhead), our attack reduces the accuracy by 91.6%
which significantly outperforms WTF-PAD. Our results
suggest that, our blind adversarial perturbation technique
drastically outperforms traditional defenses against deep
learning based website fingerprinting systems.
Time perturbation techniques: Figure 2c compares our tech-
nique with a naive countermeasure of adding random Lapla-
cian noise to the timings of the packets. We see that by adding
a Laplace noise with zero mean and 20ms standard deviation,
the accuracy of DeepCorr drops from 0.88 TP (for 10−3 FP) to
0.78 TP, but using our adversarial perturbation technique with
the same mean and standard deviation, the accuracy drops to
0.68 and 0.71 without and with invisibility, respectively.
Non-blind adversarial perturbations: Two recent works [25,
58] use “non-blind” adversarial perturbations to defeat traffic
analysis classifiers. As discussed earlier, we consider these
techniques unusable in regular traffic analysis applications,
as they can not be applied on live connections. Nevertheless,
we show that our technique even outperforms these non-blind
techniques; for instance, when DF is the target system, Mock-
ingbird [25] reduces the accuracy of DF by 59.8% with a
56.5% bandwidth overhead (in full-duplex mode), while our
direction-based blind perturbation technique reduces the ac-
curacy of DF by much higher 91.8% and with a much lower
bandwidth overhead of 11.11%.
8 Countermeasures
In this section, we evaluate defenses against our blind adver-
sarial perturbations. We start by showing why our perturba-
tions are hard to counter. We will then borrow three coun-
termeasure techniques from the image classification domain,
and show that they perform poorly against blind adversarial
perturbations. Finally, we will design a tailored, more efficient
defense on blind adversarial perturbations.
Uniqueness of Our Adversarial Perturbations: A key
property that impacts countering adversarial perturbations
is the uniqueness of adversarial perturbations: if there is only
one (few) possible adversarial perturbations, the defender can
identify them and train her model to be robust against the
known perturbations. As explained before, our adversarial
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Table 3: Timing perturbation attack on Var-CNN [3] WF scheme (93% WF accuracy)
Limited Noise Stealthy Noise
µ,σ A : SU-DU (%) Max ST-DU (#, %) Max SU-DT (#, %) Max ST-DT (#←#, %) SU-DU (%) Max ST-DU (#, %) Max SU-DT (#, %) Max ST-DT (#←#, %)
0,5 37.7 100.0 17,40.3 −,100.0 22.7 100.0 17,40.3 −,100.0
0,10 68.1 100.0 53,83.4 −,100.0 38.7 100.0 53,83.4 −,100.0
0,20 96.6 100.0 80,95.8 −,100.0 91.5 100.0 80,95.8 −,100.0
0,30 94.3 100.0 80,99.7 −,100.0 90.4 100.0 80,99.7 −,100.0
0,50 98.8 100.0 80,100.0 −,100.0 97.9 100.0 80,100.0 −,100.0
Table 4: Hybrid time/direction perturbations on Var-CNN [3].
α,µ,σ, BW Overhead (%) A : SU-DU (%) Max ST-DU (#, %) Min ST-DU (#, %) Max SU-DT (#, %) Min SU-DT (#, %) Max ST-DT (#←#, %) Min ST-DT (#←#, %)
20, 0, 5 0.04 79.0 −,100.0 4,30.0 2,69.4 6,40.3 −,100.0 −,0
100, 0, 10 2.04 83.9 −,100.0 −,100.0 2,92.8 3,72.3 −,100.0 −,10.0
500, 0, 20 11.11 97.0 −,100.0 −,100.0 3,99.9 4,92.6 −,100.0 −,20.0
1000, 0, 30 25.0 98.6 −,100.0 −,100.0 −,100.0 0,96.7 −,100.0 −,30.0
2000, 0, 50 66.66 99.0 −,100.0 −,100.0 −,100.0 9,97.7 −,100.0 −,30.0
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perturbations are not unique: our algorithm derives a pertur-
bation generator (G(z)) that for random zs can create different
perturbation vectors. To demonstrate the non-uniqueness of
our perturbations, we created 5,000 adversarial perturbations
for the applications studied in this paper (we stopped at 5,000
only due to limited GPU memory). Figure 7 shows the his-
togram of the l2 distance between the different adversarial
perturbations that we generated for DeepCorr. We can say
that the generated perturbations are not unique, and, the
adversary cannot easily detect them. These different per-
turbations however cause similar adversarial impacts on their
target model, as shown in Figure 6.
Adapting Existing Defenses: Many defenses have been de-
signed for adversarial examples in image classification appli-
cations, particularly, adversarial training [30,32,51], gradient
masking [41, 45], and region-based classification [6]. In Ap-
pendix A, we discuss how we adapt these defenses to our
networking application.
Our Tailored Defense: We use the adversarial training ap-
proach in which the defender uses adversarial perturbations
crafted by our attack to make the target model robust against
the attacks. We assume the defender knows the objective
function and its parameters. We evaluate our defense when
the defender does not know if the attack is targeted or untar-
Table 5: Evaluating various defenses against blind adversarial
perturbations (website fingerprinting application)
Adversary Strength Original No Def Madry et al. [32] IGR [45] RC [6] Our Defense
α= 20 92% 60% 84% 62% 54% 84%
α= 100 92% 28% 48% 23% 23% 60%
α= 500 92% 8% 19% 2% 7% 24%
Table 6: Evaluating various defenses against blind adversarial
perturbations (flow correlation application). FP=10−4.
Adversary Strength Original No Def Madry et al. [32] IGR [45] RC [6] Our Defense
µ = 0,σ= 10 79% 63% 70% 62% 63% 74%
µ = 0,σ= 50 79% 21% 25% 23% 22% 32%
µ = 0,σ= 100 79% 13% 18% 13% 14% 23%
geted (for both source and destination). The defender trains
the model for one epoch, and then generates blind adversarial
perturbations from all possible settings using algorithm 1.
Then, he extends the training dataset by including all of the
adversarial samples generated by the adversary and trains the
target model on the augmented train dataset. Algorithm 6 in
Appendix D sketches our defense algorithm.
Comparing our defense vs. prior defenses: We compare
our defense with previous defenses borrowed from the image
classification literature. Tables 5 and 6 compare the perfor-
mances of different defenses on DF and DeepCorr scenar-
ios, respectively. As we see, none of the prior defenses for
adversarial examples are robust against our blind adver-
sarial attacks, and in some cases, utilizing them even im-
proves the accuracy of the attack. However, the results show
that our tailored defense is more robust than prior defenses.
Since the attacker knows the exact attack mechanism, all de-
fense methods cannot perform well when the adversary uses
higher strengths in crafting adversarial perturbations. While
our defense is more robust against blind adversarial attacks,
it increases the training time of the target model by orders
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Table 7: Transferability of direction-
based perturbations (surrogate model:
DF [47], original model: [44])
Adversary Strength Transferability (%)
α= 100 30.65
α= 500 85.90
α= 1000 96.53
Table 8: Transferability of timing per-
turbations (surrogate model: AlexNet,
original model: DeepCorr [35])
Adversary Strength Transferability (%)
µ = 0,σ= 20 46.94
µ = 20,σ= 20 76.22
µ = 50,σ= 20 88.99
Table 9: Transferability of size pertur-
bations: (surrogate model: AlexNet,
original model: DeepCorr [35])
Adversary Strength Transferability (%)
N = 10 76.60
N = 20 84.54
N = 50 91.47
of magnitude which makes it not scalable for larger models.
Therefore, designing efficient defenses against blind adversar-
ial perturbations is an important future work.
9 Transferability
An adversarial perturbation scheme is called to be transfer-
able if the perturbations it creates for a target model can
misclassify other models as well. A transferable perturbation
algorithm is much more practical, as the adversary will not
need to have a whitebox access to its target model; instead, the
adversary will be able to use a surrogate (whitebox) model to
craft its adversarial perturbations, and then apply them to the
original blackbox target model.
In this section, we evaluate the transferability of our blind
adversarial perturbation technique. First, we train a surro-
gate model for our traffic analysis application. Note that, the
original and surrogate models do not need to have the same
architecture, but they are trained for the same task (likely with
difference classification accuracies). Next, we create a pertur-
bation generation function G(z) for our surrogate model (as
described before). We use this G(z) to generate perturbations,
and apply these perturbations on some sample flows. Finally,
we feed the resulted perturbed flows as inputs to the original
model (i.e., the target blackbox model) of the traffic analysis
application. We measure transferability using a common met-
ric from [40]: we identify the input flows that are correctly
classified by both original and surrogate models before ap-
plying the blind adversarial perturbation; then, among these
samples, we return the ratio of samples misclassified by the
original model over the samples misclassified by the surrogate
model as our transferability metric.
Direction-based technique To evaluate the transferability of
our direction-based perturbations, we use the DF system [47]
as the surrogate model and the WF system of Rimmer et
al. [44] as the original model. Note that the model proposed
by Rimmer et al. uses CNNs, however, it has a completely
different structure than DF. We train both models on DF’s
dataset [47], and generate blind adversarial perturbations for
the surrogate DF model. Then we test the original model
using these perturbations. Table 7 shows the transferability of
our direction-based attack with different noise strengths. As
can be seen, our direction-based attack is highly transferable.
Time-based technique For the transferability of the time-
based attack, we use DeepCorr [35] as the original model. We
use AlexNet [28] as the surrogate model, which has a com-
pletely different architecture. We train AlexNet on the same
dataset used by DeepCorr. Since the main task of AlexNet is
image classification, we modify its hyper-parameters slightly
to make it compatible with the DeepCorr dataset. To calculate
transferability, we fix the false positive rates of both surrogate
and original models to the same values (by choosing the right
flow correlation thresholds). Table 8 shows high degrees of
transferability for the time-based attack with different blind
noise strengths (for a constant false positive rate of 10−4).
Size-based technique To evaluate the transferability of the
size-based perturbations, we use DeepCorr as the original
model and AlexNet as the surrogate model, and calculate
transferability as before. Table 9 shows the transferability of
the size-based technique with different blind noise strengths
for a false positive rate of 10−4.
To summarize, we show that blind adversarial perturba-
tions are highly transferable between different model archi-
tectures, allowing them to be used by blackbox adversaries.
10 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced blind adversarial perturbations, a
mechanism to defeat DNN-based traffic analysis classifiers
which works by perturbing the features of live network con-
nections. We presented a systematic approach to generate
blind adversarial perturbations through solving specific op-
timization problems tailored to traffic analysis applications.
Our blind adversarial perturbations algorithm is generic and
can be applied on various types of traffic classifiers with dif-
ferent network constraints.
We evaluated our attack against state-of-the-art traffic anal-
ysis systems, showing that our attack outperforms traditional
techniques in defeating traffic analysis. We also showed that
our blind adversarial perturbations are even transferable be-
tween different models and architectures, so they can be ap-
plied by blackbox adversaries. Finally, we showed that ex-
isting defenses against adversarial examples perform poorly
against blind adversarial perturbations, therefore we designed
a tailored countermeasure against blind perturbations.
13
Acknowledgements
The project is generously supported by the NSF CAREER
grant CNS-1553301 and the NSF grant CNS-1564067. Milad
Nasr is supported by a Google PhD Fellowship in Security
and Privacy.
References
[1] S. Abdoli, L. Hafemann, J. Rony, I. Ayed, P. Cardinal,
and A. Koerich. Universal Adversarial Audio Perturba-
tions. arXiv preprint arXiv:1908.03173, 2019.
[2] A. Bahramali, R. Soltani, A. Houmansadr, D. Goeckel,
and D. Towsley. Practical Traffic Analysis Attacks on
Secure Messaging Applications. In NDSS, 2020.
[3] S. Bhat, D. Lu, A. Kwon, and S. Devadas. Var-CNN and
DynaFlow: Improved Attacks and Defenses for Website
Fingerprinting. CoRR, abs/1802.10215, 2018.
[4] X. Cai, R. Nithyanand, and R. Johnson. Cs-buflo: A
congestion sensitive website fingerprinting defense. In
Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Privacy in the
Electronic Society. ACM, 2014.
[5] X. Cai, X. Zhang, B. Joshi, and R. Johnson. Touch-
ing from a distance: Website fingerprinting attacks and
defenses. In Proceedings of the ACM CCS. ACM, 2012.
[6] X. Cao and N. Gong. Mitigating evasion attacks to
deep neural networks via region-based classification.
In Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Computer Security
Applications Conference. ACM, 2017.
[7] N. Carlini and D. Wagner. Adversarial examples are
not easily detected: Bypassing ten detection methods.
In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Workshop on Artificial
Intelligence and Security. ACM, 2017.
[8] N. Carlini and D. Wagner. Towards evaluating the ro-
bustness of neural networks. In IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy (SP), 2017.
[9] P. Chen, Y. Sharma, H. Zhang, J. Yi, and C. Hsieh. EAD:
Elastic-Net Attacks to Deep Neural Networks via Ad-
versarial Examples. 2017.
[10] G. Cherubin, J. Hayes, and M. Juarez. Website finger-
printing defenses at the application layer. Proceedings
on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 2017.
[11] T. Chothia and A. Guha. A statistical test for information
leaks using continuous mutual information. In Com-
puter Security Foundations Symposium (CSF). IEEE,
2011.
[12] R. Dingledine and N. Mathewson. Design
of a Blocking-Resistant Anonymity System.
https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/
design-paper/blocking.html.
[13] Y. Dong, F. Liao, T. Pang, H. Su, J. Zhu, X. Hu, and
J. Li. Boosting adversarial attacks with momentum.
In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer
Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2018.
[14] K. Eykholt, I. Evtimov, E. Fernandes, B. Li, A. Rahmati,
C. Xiao, A. Prakash, T. Kohno, and D. Song. Robust
physical-world attacks on deep learning visual classi-
fication. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2018.
[15] I. Goodfellow, Y. Bengio, and A. Courville. Deep learn-
ing. 2016.
[16] I. Goodfellow, J. Pouget-Abadie, M. Mirza, B. Xu,
D. Warde-Farley, S. Ozair, A. Courville, and Y. Bengio.
Generative Adversarial Nets. In Advances in Neural In-
formation Processing Systems. Curran Associates, Inc.,
2014.
[17] I. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy. Explaining
and harnessing adversarial examples. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1412.6572, 2014.
[18] I. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy. Explaining and
Harnessing Adversarial Examples. In 3rd International
Conference on Learning Representations, 2015.
[19] J. Hayes and G. Danezis. k-fingerprinting: A robust
scalable website fingerprinting technique. In USENIX
Security Symposium, 2016.
[20] J. Hayes and G. Danezis. Learning Universal Adversar-
ial Perturbations with Generative Models. In 2018 IEEE
Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW). IEEE, 2018.
[21] K. He, X. Zhang, S. Ren, and J. Sun. Deep Residual
Learning for Image Recognition. 2016 IEEE Conference
on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR),
2015.
[22] W. He, B. Li, and D. Song. Decision Boundary Analysis
of Adversarial Examples. In International Conference
on Learning Representations, 2018.
[23] A. Houmansadr, N. Kiyavash, and N. Borisov. RAIN-
BOW: A Robust And Invisible Non-Blind Watermark
for Network Flows. In NDSS, 2009.
[24] A. Houmansadr, N. Kiyavash, and N. Borisov. Non-
blind watermarking of network flows. IEEE/ACM Trans-
actions on Networking (TON), 22(4), 2014.
14
[25] M. Imani, M. Rahman, N. Mathews, A. Joshi, and
M. Wright. Mockingbird: Defending Against Deep-
Learning-Based Website Fingerprinting Attacks with
Adversarial Traces. CoRR, 2019.
[26] M. Juarez, M. Imani, M. Perry, C. Diaz, and M. Wright.
Toward an efficient website fingerprinting defense. In
European Symposium on Research in Computer Security.
Springer, 2016.
[27] D. Kingma and J. Ba. Adam: A Method for Stochastic
Optimization. International Conference on Learning
Representations, 2014.
[28] A. Krizhevsky, I. Sutskever, and G. Hinton. Imagenet
classification with deep convolutional neural networks.
In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems,
2012.
[29] A. Kurakin, I. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio. Adversarial
examples in the physical world. ArXiv, abs/1607.02533,
2016.
[30] A. Kurakin, I. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio. Adver-
sarial machine learning at scale. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1611.01236, 2016.
[31] B. Levine, M. Reiter, C. Wang, and M. Wright. Timing
attacks in low-latency mix systems. In International
Conference on Financial Cryptography. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2004.
[32] A. Madry, A. Makelov, L. Schmidt, D. Tsipras, and
A. Vladu. Towards deep learning models resistant to
adversarial attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.06083,
2017.
[33] S. Moosavi-Dezfooli, A. Fawzi, O. Fawzi, and
P. Frossard. Universal adversarial perturbations. In
Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer
Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2017.
[34] S. Moosavi-Dezfooli, A. Fawzi, and P. Frossard. Deep-
Fool: A Simple and Accurate Method to Fool Deep Neu-
ral Networks. In 2016 IEEE Conference on Computer
Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2016.
[35] M. Nasr, A. Bahramali, and A. Houmansadr. Deepcorr:
strong flow correlation attacks on tor using deep learn-
ing. In Proceedings of the ACM CCS, 2018.
[36] M. Nasr, A. Houmansadr, and A. Mazumdar. Com-
pressive Traffic Analysis: A New Paradigm for Scalable
Traffic Analysis. In Proceedings of the ACM CCS, 2017.
[37] M. Nasr, A. Houmansadr, and A. Mazumdar. Com-
pressive Traffic Analysis: A New Paradigm for Scalable
Traffic Analysis. In Proceedings of the ACM CCS. ACM,
2017.
[38] A. Panchenko, F. Lanze, J. Pennekamp, T. Engel, A. Zin-
nen, M. Henze, and K. Wehrle. Website Fingerprinting
at Internet Scale. In NDSS, 2016.
[39] A. Panchenko, L. Niessen, A. Zinnen, and T. En-
gel. Website fingerprinting in onion routing based
anonymization networks. In Proceedings of the 10th an-
nual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society,
2011.
[40] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, and I. Goodfellow. Trans-
ferability in Machine Learning: from Phenomena to
Black-Box Attacks using Adversarial Samples. ArXiv,
2016.
[41] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, X. Wu, S. Jha, and A. Swami.
Distillation as a defense to adversarial perturbations
against deep neural networks. In IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy (SP). IEEE, 2016.
[42] A. Paszke, S. Gross, S. Chintala, G. Chanan, E. Yang,
Z. DeVito, Z. Lin, A. Desmaison, L. Antiga, and
A. Lerer. Automatic Differentiation in PyTorch. In
NIPS Autodiff Workshop, 2017.
[43] Tor: Pluggable transports. https://www.torproject.
org/docs/pluggable-transports.html.en.
[44] V. Rimmer, D. Preuveneers, M. Juarez, T. Van, and
W. Joosen. Automated website fingerprinting through
deep learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1708.06376, 2017.
[45] A. Ross and F. Doshi-Velez. Improving the adversarial
robustness and interpretability of deep neural networks
by regularizing their input gradients. In Thirty-second
AAAI conference on artificial intelligence, 2018.
[46] V. Shmatikov and M. Wang. Timing analysis in low-
latency mix networks: Attacks and defenses. In Eu-
ropean Symposium on Research in Computer Security
(ESORICS). Springer, 2006.
[47] P. Sirinam, M. Imani, M. Juarez, and M. Wright. Deep
fingerprinting: Undermining website fingerprinting de-
fenses with deep learning. In Proceedings of the ACM
CCS. ACM, 2018.
[48] J. Su, D. Vargas, and K. Sakurai. One Pixel Attack for
Fooling Deep Neural Networks. IEEE Transactions on
Evolutionary Computation, PP, 10 2017.
[49] Y. Sun, A. Edmundson, L. Vanbever, O. Li, J. Rexford,
M. Chiang, and P. Mittal. RAPTOR: routing attacks on
privacy in tor. In USENIX Security Symposium, 2015.
[50] C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna, D. Er-
han, I. Goodfellow, and R. Fergus. Intriguing properties
of neural networks. 2013.
15
[51] F. Tramèr, A. Kurakin, N. Papernot, I. Goodfellow,
D. Boneh, and P. McDaniel. Ensemble adversar-
ial training: Attacks and defenses. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1705.07204, 2017.
[52] V. Vapnik. The nature of statistical learning theory.
Springer science & business media, 2013.
[53] T. Wang, X. Cai, R. Nithyanand, R. Johnson, and I. Gold-
berg. Effective Attacks and Provable Defenses for Web-
site Fingerprinting. In USENIX Security Symposium,
San Diego, CA, August 2014.
[54] T. Wang and I. Goldberg. Improved website fingerprint-
ing on tor. In Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop
on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society. ACM,
2013.
[55] T. Wang and I. Goldberg. On realistically attacking tor
with website fingerprinting. Proceedings on Privacy
Enhancing Technologies, 2016.
[56] T. Wang and I. Goldberg. Walkie-talkie: An efficient
defense against passive website fingerprinting attacks.
In USENIX Security Symposium, 2017.
[57] K. Yoda and H. Etoh. Finding a Connection Chain for
Tracing Intruders. In ESORICS, 2000.
[58] X. Zhang, J. Hamm, M. K Reiter, and Y. Zhang. Statis-
tical privacy for streaming traffic. In NDSS, 2019.
[59] Y. Zhang and V. Paxson. Detecting Stepping Stones. In
USENIX Security Symposium, 2000.
[60] Y. Zhu, X. Fu, B. Graham, R. Bettati, and W. Zhao. On
flow correlation attacks and countermeasures in mix net-
works. In International Workshop on Privacy Enhancing
Technologies. Springer, 2004.
A Adapting Traditional Defenses to Adversar-
ial Examples
Madry et al. [32] presented a scalable adversarial training
approach to increase the robustness of deep learning mod-
els to adversarial examples. In each iteration of training, this
method generates a set of adversarial examples and uses them
in the training phase. Madry et al.’s defense is the most robust
defense among the adversarial training based defenses [7]. We
cannot use this method as is, since in the image recognition
applications, pixels can take real values, while in direction-
based traffic analysis methods, features take only two values
(-1, +1). Therefore, we modify this defense to our setting. To
generate a set of adversarial examples in the training process,
we randomly choose a number of packets and flip their direc-
tions from -1 to +1 and vice versa. Similarly, for the packet
timings and sizes we enforced all of application constraints
for generating the adversarial examples.
From the gradient mask approach, we used the input gra-
dient regularization (IGR) technique of Ross and Doshi-
Velez [45]. IGR is more robust against adversarial attacks
compared to its previous work [41]. Their defense trains a
model to have smooth input gradients with fewer extreme
values which becomes more resistant to adversarial examples.
We utilize this approach to train a robust model using DF
structure. We evaluated the direction-based attack against this
defense with parameter λ= 10.
While the previous defenses train a robust model against
adversarial attacks, Cao and Gong [6] designed a defense
method which does not change the training process. They
proposed a region-based classification (RC) method which
creates a hypercube centered at the input to predict its la-
bel. Then, the method samples a set of data points from the
crafted hypercube and uses an existing trained model to pro-
duce predicted label for each sampled data point; Finally, it
uses majority voting to generate the final class label for the
given input. We need to make changes to the region-based
classification defense. In contrast to images, we cannot create
a hypercube centered at the input by just adding random real
values to the packet direction sequences which have values
-1, 1. Instead, for each input, we create the hypercube by ran-
domly choosing a number of packets in the sequence and
flipping their directions. To apply region-based classification
in the test phase of the direction-based method while adding
blind perturbations, we randomly choose 125 packets and
change their directions to form the hypercube. Similar to Cao
and Gong, we call this number as the radius of the hypercube.
We choose this value for the radius because 125 is the max-
imum number of packets we can use to form the hypercube
while the accuracy of the region-based method does not go
below the accuracy of the original DF model. Using radius of
125 for hypercubes, we apply the region-based classification
against our attack. For time and size based methods, we use
the strength of the adversary to generate the hypercubes.
B Model Parameters
Table 10 shows the structure of the adversarial model for each
type of perturbation and also the discriminator model.
C The Scheme of Our Blind Adversarial Per-
turbation Technique
Figure 8 illustrates the main components of our blind adver-
sarial perturbations algorithm.
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Table 10: Tuned parameters of the adversarial models and discriminator model
Model Number of hidden layers Hidden layer units Optimizer Learning rate Activation
Direction-based 1 [500] Adam 10−3 ReLu
Time-based 1 [500] Adam 10−3 ReLu
Size-based (ordering) 1 [500] Adam 10−3 ReLu
Size-based (amplitude) 1 [500] Adam 10−3 ReLu
Discriminator 2 [1000,1] Adam 10−4 ReLu
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Figure 8: The block diagram of our blind adversarial perturbation technique
D Defense Algorithm
Algorithm 6 summarizes the adversarial approach to train a ro-
bust model against blind adversarial attacks in traffic analysis
applications.
Algorithm 6 Adversarial defense against blind adversarial
perturbation
Randomly initialize network N
L f ← target model loss function
M ← domain remapping function
R ← domain regularizations function
G(z)← initialize the blind adversarial perturbation model
parameters (θG)
T ← epochs
Z← [] // List of adversarial perturbations
for epoch t ∈ {1 · · ·T} do
Train the model N for one epoch on training datasetDtr
Z ← generate adversarial perturbations using Algo-
rithm 1 from all possible targets and focus classeså
end for
Dtr.extend(Dtr +Z)
return N
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